Running title: How does the brain process upright and inverted faces? 
INTRODUCTION
For more than three decades, behavioral studies have revealed that picture-plane inversion dramatically impairs face recognition (e.g. Hochberg & Galper, 1967) . A landmark paper on this topic is that of Yin (1969) in which face recognition was found to be disproportionately affected by inversion, an observation called the face inversion effect (FIE) . This suggested that faces may be "special", or processed in a qualitatively different manner than other objects by a dedicated module (e.g. Ellis, 1975; Kanwisher, 2000; Nachson, 1995) . Yet, another landmark paper in the literature on face inversion is the last extensive review on the topic from Valentine (1988) who concluded that the effect of inversion provided little or no evidence of a unique process involved in face recognition.
In recent years, many other phenomena and techniques (including fMRI and ERPs) have allowed a more thorough examination of the modularity hypothesis for face recognition (e.g. see Kanwisher, 2000; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Tovée, 1998) , lessening a considerable theoretical burden on the FIE, whose causes remain an active topic of investigation. Indeed, yet a third beacon in this literature is the study by Diamond and Carey (1986) by studying how putative face-specific effects can be obtained with nonface categories through extensive experience at discriminating visually similar objects (e.g. Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al., 1998; Rhodes, Brennan & Carey, 1987; Rossion et al., in press; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) . These results suggest that face-specific effects are a reflection of the different goals and recognition strategies associated with faces through experience, and that, under certain conditions, the same goals and strategies can be associated with nonface objects.
In the developmental literature, an analog of the FIE is the finding that newborns prefer to look at upright rather than inverted face-like configurations (e.g. Valenza et al., 1996) . This is often cited as evidence for an innate basis to face processing. However, a series of elegant experiments recently reveals that newborns prefer the "upright" version of any pattern with more elements located in the upper part of the configuration (Simion et al., 2001) . Therefore, any effect of inversion in infants could simply reflect this general principle. Similarly, the observation of a face inversion effect in chimpanzees raised by humans for both chimpanzee and human faces, but not capucin monkey faces (Parr et al., 1998) supports the view that it is not the face configuration per se that is a critical factor for the FIE.
Thus, the FIE does not appear to reflect processes unique to faces in the sense that they could only develop and/or be utilized to process objects with the geometry of faces. Rather, it probably reflects a combination of general constraints of the visual system and the extensive expertise we possess in face recognition. However, as Valentine (1998) noted, even if it is not unique to faces, the basis of the FIE remains interesting: in particular it offers a window on the different processes 
I. What causes the face inversion effect?
The FIE has been obtained in old-new recognition paradigms (e.g. Carey, Diamond & Woods, 1980; Philips & Rawles, 1979; Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970) and 2 alternative forced choice paradigms with or without delay (e.g. Carey & Diamond, 1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Freire et al., 2000; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Valentine & Bruce, 1986; Yarmey, 1971; Yin, 1969) . It is virtually the same for unfamiliar and familiar faces (Collishaw & Hole, 2000; Rock, 1974; Yarmey, 1971) . It is observed when orientation is manipulated in separate blocks -or in between subjects designs -(e.g. Toyama, 1975; Valentine & Bruce, 1986) as well as in randomized presentation of upright and inverted faces (e.g. Carey & Diamond, 1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970; Yarmey, 1971; Yin, 1969) .
Valentine (1988, 1991) Phelps & Roberts, 1994; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996) . Recently, Freire and colleagues (2000) compared the discrimination of pairs of upright or inverted faces in simultaneous or sequential presentation (1 s, 5 s or 10 s delay).
They found no effect of having a delay or of its length and obtained a FIE in all conditions in which faces differed only on the basis of metric.
There is thus a growing consensus that the FIE occurs primarily during perceptual encoding rather in the architecture of long-term memory.
This is consistent with the fact that the first and perhaps only consistent effect of inversion in
ERPs is obtained on a very early potential peaking around 170 ms after stimulus presentation (e.g., Rossion et al., 2000a) .
Many recent studies investigated the difference in encoding processes between upright and inverted faces. At the time of
Valentine's study (1988) , there was already some evidence that configural information was more important in the encoding of upright than inverted faces (Sergent, 1984; Young, Hellawell & Hay, 1987) . Many models for this configural information have been offered (see Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Leder & Bruce, 1998; 2000; Rhodes et al., 1993; Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997) . Covering all such proposals is beyond the purpose of this review (the reader is referred to discussions by Diamond & Carey, 1986; Farah et al., 1998; Gauthier & Tarr, in press; Rhodes et al., 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997) but one distinction has become particularly important recently: This is the interpretation of configural information as either "holistic" or "relational".
The holistic interpretation suggests that configural effects, such as the better recognition of a face part presented in a whole face than in isolation (Tanaka & Farah, 1993) , reflect the existence of Gestalt patterns or undifferentiated templates (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Farah, Tanaka & Drain, 1995) . In its extreme version, this model claims that an object yielding these configural effects is represented as a whole and that its parts are not represented explicitly (Farah et al., 1998) . The relational interpretation instead proposes that configural information is represented as the explicit and precise relative spatial relationships between the different object parts, for instance the distance between the eyes (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Rakover & Teuber, 1997) .
One interesting aspect of the relational interpretation is that configural effects need not involve the entire object: they can occur locally, for instance the image of a half face may trigger configural processing because the relationships between the parts shown can be processed in terms of their relative relations (whereas in a holistic account, a half face may not be enough to invoke the appropriate template and default part-based mechanisms have to be used). In a relational account there is only a fine line between stimuli evoking configural effects and those which do not: whereas the relations between two eyes is configural information, the shape of these two eyes may not be 1 (in contrast, the holistic model sees both as local information that may not be sufficient to invoke a template and lead to configural effects). To test the relational hypothesis, Leder and Bruce (2000) created a set of 8 faces, each containing a unique local feature as well as a unique relational feature (e.g., one face had a unique mouth within the set and the same eyes as another face but 1 Most authors are careful to note that changing the shape of features may also modify their relative position to other parts. However, many studies successfully abolish inversion effects using faces which differ only in feature shape, color or brightness (Freire et al., 2000; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Leder & Bruce, 1998 (Leder & Bruce, 2000, experiment 2) and suggests a strong bias in favor of the use of relational information in face processing (perhaps even obligatory).
Clear demonstrations for the relational hypothesis are an important development in the last 10 years or so and perhaps one of the most significant contributions of the FIE to our understanding of face processing. In many prior studies setting out to measure configural effects, holistic and relational information are both disrupted and could both account for the findings (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Farah et al., 1998; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Kemp, McManus & Pigott, 1990; Rhodes et al., 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Sergent, 1984; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Young, Hellawell & Hay, 1987) .
Evidence in favor of the relational hypothesis (Freire et al., 2000; Leder & Bruce, 1998; 2000; Leder et al., 2001; Murray, Yong & Rhodes, 2000) seems to indicate that relational information is represented explicitly (e.g., the shape of each eye and the precise distance between the eyes would be part of the representation of face). If this was the case, then we would also need to postulate that when part information is activated, that for the relationships between parts is also activated. This is because configural effects are obtained even when subjects explicitly try to ignore the other parts (e.g., Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Young, Hellawell and Hay, 1987 ). An explicit representation of the parts, as well as that of the distance between them, with a very strong connection between the two kinds of information is a reasonable interpretation of the relational findings.
However, at least one alternative exists in which there is no qualitative difference between mechanisms used in processing upright vs. inverted faces, faces vs. objects or between novices and experts (e.g., Bruyer, Galvez & Prairial, 1993; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Valentine & Bruce, 1988) . Perrett & Oram (1993) , 1997) . Similarly, at the outset of an extensive training protocol, subjects can also
show configural effects for all Greeble parts (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) . Gauthier and Tarr (in press) recently proposed that such a complete interdependence between all parts may be obtained only because subjects were tested when they were extremely practiced with a category.
However, when configural processing is measured at several points during expertise acquisition, these effects appear at different points for different Greeble parts (Gauthier & Tarr, in press ). In other words, there is a time in the training where some of the parts appear to be represented relationally whereas other parts are not. It is possible that subjects are accessing an object template only for some of the parts of the object, but a more plausible alternative is that we Searcy & Bartlett, 1996) .
Whereas this seems to be a fatal blow to the holistic hypothesis, a set of overlapping holistic templates, each including more than single "parts", may be able to account for the local relational effects as well as the pattern of acquisition of these effects in newly trained experts.
II. Where and when in the brain does the face inversion effect occur?
Recent work using fMRI and ERPs focused on determining the neural bases of the difference between faces and objects (e.g. Bentin et al., 1996; Gauthier et al., 1999; Kanwisher, Chun & McDermott, 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Rossion et al., 2000a ). The fusiform face area. The most robust difference in activity between faces and objects has been described in the lateral middle fusiform gyrus, bilaterally but often stronger in the right hemisphere (e.g. Gauthier et al., 1999; Haxby et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy 1997; Rossion et al., 2000b; Sergent, Otha & McDonald, 1992) . This is the region that has been dubbed the 'fusiform face area' (FFA, Kanwisher et al., 1997) . There remain however disagreements about whether this region represents in itself a module for face perception (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kanwisher, 2000) , or
whether it is a part of a larger network involved in general object recognition, including faces (Haxby, 2001; Ishai et al., 1999) that can be modified among other factors by task constraints and visual expertise (Gauthier et al., 1999; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000) . Four published fMRI studies compared the processing of upright and inverted faces (Aguirre et al., 1999; Gauthier et al., 1999; Haxby et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1998) .
Three of these studies found a small but significant decrease for face inversion in the FFA (bilateral: Gauthier et al., 1999; Haxby et al., 1999 ; only right hemisphere tested:
Kanwisher et al., 1998). There was a small but non-significant decrease observed in the FFA for inverted faces in the fourth study (Aguirre et al., 1999) . However, in contrast to the other fMRI experiments, this study reported a very small difference between upright faces and objects in the FFA, and no significant increase for objects (cars) as compared to faces in the region normally selective for faces, suggesting an overall lack of statistical power. On the basis of the other studies, face inversion appears to reduce the level of activation in the FFA.
What is the effect of object inversion in the same region? Whereas objects were not tested in Kanwisher et al. (1998 ), Haxby et al. (1999 reported no difference for upright and inverted houses; Aguirre et al. (1999) found no differences between upright and inverted cars;
and Gauthier et al. (1999) found only a small difference for upright and inverted novel objects (Greebles) before any familiarization with these objects. However, as subjects acquired expertise with Greebles the difference in activity for upright vs. inverted Greebles (even unfamiliar ones) showed a significant increase in the right FFA (Gauthier et al., 1999) . In recent analyses correlating behavioral changes during expertise training and the neural changes in this region, Gauthier & Tarr (in press) found that an increase in holistic processing 2 during training was significantly correlated with activity in the right FFA for upright Greebles (but not for inverted Greebles, nor upright or inverted faces).
In line with behavioral effects (Yin, 1969) , the FFA shows a larger inversion effect for faces than nonface objects. In addition, when studied with either behavioral (Diamond & Carey, 1986) or fMRI (Gauthier et al., 1999) methods, the FIE appears to be a general phenomenon related to the subjects' expertise (and associated changes in processing strategies).
2 The effect correlated with FFA activity was actually called "holistic-inclusive". As subjects become experts with Greebles, they no longer can restrict a part judgment to half of a Greeble image (is the bottom of these two Greebles the same?): part judgments seem to obligatorily include all parts present in the image. Thus, when the part to be ignored is inconsistent with the judgment, experts show more interference than novices. This consistency effect is not properly speaking "configural" because it was independent of whether the two parts were in the original or anew configuration. It may reflect a different facet of expert processing than the relational effects described by Leder et al., (1998) .
The other face-sensitive regions.
Posterior to the FFA, a region of the inferior occipital gyrus (termed OFA for "occipital face area") also responds more to faces than objects, generally with a larger response in the right hemisphere (Gauthier et al., 1999; Halgren et al., 1999; Haxby et al., 1999; Levy et al., 2001; Rossion et al., 2000b; Sergent et al., 1992) .
Haxby et al. (2000) suggest that this region is involved in the early perception of facial features and may provide input to the FFA and the face-selective areas in the superior temporal sulcus. However, there is no current fMRI or anatomical data supporting the view that there is a processing stage at which facial features are extracted, before they would be later combined to form whole representation of faces. Rather, several studies suggest that encoding faces as a whole is dominant over encoding individual facial features (e.g. Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Farah et al., 1998; Hillger & Koenig, 1991) .
Moreover, the early N170 component sensitive to faces peak earlier for whole faces than isolated face features (e.g. Bentin et al., 1996; Taylor et al., 2001) . In regards to the FIE and the OFA, Haxby et al. (1999) found larger activity for inverted than upright faces and objects in this region. In anatomically-defined regions of the inferior occipital gyrus (infOG) and lateral occipital gyrus (latOG) which would include the area typically defined functionally as the OFA, significant inversion effects for both faces and
Greebles have been found (Gauthier, 1998) .
Within these regions, some voxels showed a significant preference for upright over inverted Gauthier et al., 1999) with a non-significant decrease for object inversion.
3 These analyses were performed independently on the positive and negative voxels, comparing their density in a region of interest (ROI) to the mean density in all ROIs. It is thus possible to find within the same ROI a significant preference for upright and for inverted stimuli, as long as those are expressed in different voxels.
Regions showing a preference for objects over faces. Given that our expertise with faces is fairly limited to the upright orientation, it is not so surprising that face-selective areas respond less to inverted than upright faces.
Along the same lines, one may expect that areas which generally respond more to nonface objects than faces should prefer inverted faces.
These "object-selective" areas include a medial area, joining part of the ventral occipital lobe to the parahippocampal gyrus (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; Haxby et al., 1999; Ishai, et al., 1999) . There is also an area lateral to the FFA in the inferior temporal gyrus which generally responds more to objects than to faces (e.g., it responded more to chairs than faces in . In addition, inverted faces are not processed just like any other objects in the FFA: they elicit more activity than nonface objects in this region (e.g, Kanwisher et al., 2001) . This is consistent with the fact that training with upright objects transfers to some extent, although not completely, to inverted objects. For instance,
Greeble experts perform better with inverted
Greebles than novices do 4 Gauthier et al., (2000b) found that bird and car experts also engaged a bilateral area in the parahippocampal gyrus for their category of expertise relative to the other category. This was not observed with experts for novel objects (Gauthier et al., 1999) and could result from the associated semantic knowledge in real-world experts. faces and objects such as the N200, which show a larger response to faces (Allison et al., 1994; 1999) at some locations but may be larger to objects at other locations (Allison et al., 1999) , are recorded on a multitude of sites along the ventral and lateral parts of occipito-temporal cortex (Allison et al., 1999) . Most of these local Temporally, the N170 is the first (and the only consistent) difference between faces and other object categories, with larger amplitude for faces than nonface objects (Bentin et al., 1996; Botzel, Schultze & Stodieck, 1995; Eimer, 1998; Rebai et al., 2001; Rossion et al., 2000a; in press; Taylor et al., 1999 ; see Figure 2 ). The N170 is bilateral, sometimes with a slight right hemisphere advantage (Bentin et al., 1996) but the N170 amplitude difference between faces and objects is generally as large at right and left scalp locations. Although some ERP studies (generally using passive viewing of the stimuli compared) described small negative deflections for objects (e.g. Bentin et al., 1996) Whereas several authors (e.g. Bentin et al., 1996; Eimer, 1998) emphasize the difference in amplitude of the N170 for faces vs. nonface objects, Rossion et al (2000a) recently suggested that a better candidate for a face-selective effect in scalp recording may be the N170 delay for upside-down pictures that is obtained only with faces. Face inversion significantly delays the peak latency of the N170 (Bentin et al., 1996; Eimer, 2000a; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 1998; Rossion et al., 1999a; in press; Rebai et al., 2001; Sagiv & Bentin, 2001; Taylor et al., 2001 ) and most often also increases its amplitude (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 1998; Rossion et al., 1999a; Sagiv & Bentin, 2001 ; see Figure 3 ). These effects are also observed on the VPP, the positive counterpart of the N170 (e.g. Jeffreys, 1993; Rossion et al., 1999a) . The delay of the N170 is small (around 10 ms) but very robust and consistent across studies and paradigms. It is also observed on the face-sensitive intracranial N200, which shows a similar delay (11 ms) in both hemispheres for face inversion .
These findings on an early visual component confirm the perceptual origin of the FIE suggested by behavioral and fMRI studies.
The N170 appears to be the only component (with its positive counterpart, the VPP) delayed by face inversion
5
. The delay for inversion has not been observed for other categories of objects tested (e.g., chairs, cars, shoes, houses, see Rossion et al., 2000a) . The exception is a study of Greeble expertise (Rossion et al., in press ).
Whereas Greeble novices showed identical N170 potentials for upright and inverted 5 A MEG study reported a slight but significant delay with face inversion already at the level of the preceding P1 (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 1998) . It is thus possible that such effects occur earlier as they are usually measured at the N170 peak latency but most probably originate before 170 ms, in between the P1 (around 100 ms) and the N170. at approximately the same latency (Perrett et al., 1998) . However, a slower accumulative rate of activity at the level of the whole cell population may underlie the population potential response delay, and thus a peak delay on cortical surface or scalp ERPs (see Perrett et al., 1998) . In addition to the delay with inversion, several ERP studies also described an enhancement of the N170 to inverted faces as compared to upright faces (Rossion et al., 1999a; in press; Sagiv & Bentin, 2001 ). This (Perrett et al., 1988; 1998) . However, the difference between scalp and intracranial recordings may be explained by the fact that the scalp N170 is likely to reflect the activation of several local cortical potentials, some of which are also larger for objects than faces (Allison et al., 1999) images (Halgren et al., 1999; Ishai et al., 1999) , whereas this is a manipulation that greatly influences face recognition (but see Gauthier and Epstein, 2001 , for evidence that the right FFA responds more to lowpass than highpass images of faces). Third, the FFA only shows a small effect of inversion for grayscale faces (Aguirre et al., 1999; Gauthier et al., 1999; Haxby et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1998) . Kanwisher et al. (1998) (1) the FFA can be shown to be involved in individual discrimination for both faces and nonface objects (Gauthier et al., 1997 (Gauthier et al., , 2000c Hoffman & Haxby, 2000) and (2) lesions in the territory of face-selective areas can lead to a severe deficit in face discrimination while 'face detection' remains intact when tested in prosopagnosia (e.g. Bodamer, 1947; Bruyer et al., 1983) .
In parallel with the proposal that the FFA may be involved in face detection, the faceselective N170 component has also been argued to be implicated in a similar stage of processing, (e.g. Bentin, Deouell & Soroker, 1999; Bentin & Deouell, 2000; Liu et al., 2000; Sagiv & Bentin, 2001 ) based on the same arguments: the absence of N170 modulation by face familiarity (Bentin & Deouell, 2000; Eimer, 2000c; Rossion et al., 1999b) , line drawings vs. grayscale face images (Liu et al., 2000) as well as the absence of N170 amplitude reduction for inverted faces (Bentin et al., 1996) . These observations have led to the suggestion that the mechanism associated with the N170 acts on basic physiognomic features and precedes within-category identification (Sagiv & Bentin, 2001) , being an electrophysiological manifestation of the structural encoding stage proposed by Bruce and Young (1986) (see also Eimer, 1998; .
However, it must be stressed that the "structural encoding stage" in terms of Bruce and Young (1986) Note that some ERP studies reported effects of face repetition much earlier that 100 ms (e.g. Seeck et al., 1997; Braeutigam, Baily & Swithenby, 2001 ) but they are likely to be related to the mere repetition of the same complex images, and thus of low-level visual properties, rather than of the same facial identities. When different images of the same facial identities are repeated, earlier effects of repetitions are found peaking at around 150 ms following stimulus onset (Campanella et al., 2000; Munte et al., 1998) .
faces are categorized as quickly at the basic level than at the subordinate or individual level (Tanaka, in press ). This is thought to reflect a "shift" in entry-level due to our expertise with faces, and it is also observed in real-world experts (e.g., bird experts recognize a bird as a robin as fast as they recognize it is a birdTanaka & Taylor, 1991) and subjects trained to expertise with novel objects (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) . objects that also leads to a behavioral and neural inversion effect is one where observers acquire exquisite skills in discriminating visually-similar objects of a category (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997, in press; Gauthier et al., 1999; Rossion et al., in press; Tanaka & Curran, 2001) . Therefore, although expertise may also influence processing at the basic level (e.g., Purcell & Stewart, 1988) , subordinate-level recognition appears more central to the inversion effect.
CONCLUSIONS
The dramatic decrease of performance for face inversion as compared to object inversion observed more than 30 years ago (Yin, 1969) continues to be an interesting and stimulating topic in cognitive neuroscience. 
